Both in theory and practice, capital controls and dual exchange rate systems can be part of a country's optimal tax policy. We …rst show how a dual exchange rate system can be interpreted as a tax (or subsidy) on international capital income. We show that a dual exchange rate system, with separate commercial and …nancial exchange rates, drives a wedge between the domestic and foreign returns on comparable assets. As a borrower, the government itself is a direct bene…ciary. Secondly, based on data from South Africa, we present empirical evidence of this revenue implicit in a dual exchange rate system; a revenue that amounted to as much as 0.1 percent of GDP for the South African government. However, this paper also shows that both the capital controls and the dual exchange rate system in South Africa gave rise to many perverse unanticipated e¤ects. The latter may render capital controls and dual exchange rate systems unattractive in the end and, thereby, provides a rationale for the recent trend in exchange rate liberalization and uni…cation.
Introduction
Many countries today maintain capital controls. As of 2005, only ten out the IMF's 185 members are fully free of controls on capital account transactions. 1 It should be emphasized, though, that the most restrictive ones are to be found in developing countries. On the other hand, as of 2005, only eleven countries out of the IMF's 185 members are reported to have more than one exchange rate. Each of them is, again, a developing country. 2 Although this number seems small, it has only been so since a few years. At the end of 1993, as Kiguel, et al. (1997) point out, over 25% of the then 158 developing country members of the IMF had more than one exchange rate. South Africa (hereafter also SA), the subject of this paper, was one of them.
As, among others, Aizenman and Guidotti (1990) , Giovannini and De Melo (1991) and Greenwood and Kimbrough (1985) argue, capital controls, often accompanied by various types of …nancial market restrictions, can have substantial …scal implications. Moreover, as, among others, Bernstein (1950) , Adams and Greenwood (1985) , Aizenman (1986) , and Frenkel and Razin (1989) argue, dual exchange rate regimes, as well, have long been recognized to be quasi-…scal activities. In this paper we de…ne a typical (standard) dual exchange rate system to be a system where one exchange rate is applied to current account transactions and another exchange rate is used for capital account transactions. 3 The former exchange rate is often …xed and labelled the commercial exchange rate, whereas the latter is often allowed to ‡oat and termed the …nancial exchange rate. A dual exchange rate system with, for example, a commercial exchange rate (for current account transactions) and a …nancial exchange rate (for capital account transactions), is, as we will show below, equivalent to a tax on foreign source income accruing to domestic residents if the commercial exchange rate is more appreciated than the …nancial exchange rate.
As a result of their …scal implications, capital controls and dual exchange rate systems can especially be found in developing countries. That is, they both can have a useful role as part of a developing country's optimal tax scheme (see, for example, Aizenman (1986) ). As a result of, for example, a taxation implicit in the dual exchange rate system on foreign source income accruing to domestic residents, the domestic interest rate could be set lower than the international interest rate. As a borrower, the government itself will be a direct bene…ciary.
In this paper our focus is …rmly on South Africa, a country we choose deliberately. First, South Africa is a key developing country. Second, despite the fact that South Africa is a developing country, historically (and presently) it has a quite sophisticated and well-developed …nancial system. This makes it possible to obtain (reliable) data. Third, ever since the Sharpeville massacre in 1960 and the subsequent capital out ‡ow, South Africa has been characterized by (some or other form of) capital controls. Fourth, over the period from 1960 until 1995 South Africa experienced …ve di¤erent exchange rate systems of which four were dual exchange rate systems. Only two of these periods, however, were characterized by a dual exchange rate system as de…ned above, making it possible for us to compare it with the other three. Finally, over the period under discussion the South African government almost exclusively borrowed from its own residents. This can be seen from …gure 1 below. 4 In addition, from 1985 onwards (until 1994), South Africa was subject to international sanctions and was not allowed to borrow from the IMF or any other o¢ cial agency. As a result, the above discussed issue of using capital controls and/ or a dual exchange rate system as part of the optimal tax scheme was therefore especially important for South Africa. For a country that has a "normal", single exchange rate system without restrictions on capital ‡ows, the uncovered interest rate parity (UIP) condition should, at least in theory, hold for comparable assets. 5 Below, in …gure 2, the deviation from uncovered interest rate parity (for SA and the US) is given. 4 The data has been obtained from Thomson Datastream, where we used SADBTDLNA and SADBTFLNA for the domestic and foreign South African government debt, respectively. The total government debt was computed by adding these two. 5 For a recent discussion of UIP see Lambelet and Mihailov (2006) . Using a cross-section of trend growth rates of relevant variables for 18 OECD countries in the post-Bretton Woods/ pre-EMU ‡oating rate period (1976) (1977) (1978) (1979) (1980) (1981) (1982) (1983) (1984) (1985) (1986) (1987) (1988) and employing a variety of single-equation and system estimation methods, they present robust evidence that (what they label) the 'tripleparity law' (which combines UIP, PPP and real interest parity (RIP)) ultimately holds for large and diversi…ed economies. 6 For this make use of equation (2) , which is given in the main text. Straightforwardly, we Interestingly, in the 1970s there was an extended period (which we highlighted in the …gure) in which UIP did fundamentally not hold. More speci…cally, although most of SA debt was held by SA residents (as indicated by …gure 1), during the highlighted period the return for a non-resident (US) holder of South African debt was structurally in excess of the return on comparable assets in the United States (as indicated by the return di¤erential over UIP). In what follows we will explain that this excess return was in fact equivalent to an investment subsidy, which in turn came about as a by-product of South Africa's dual exchange rate system that was employed at the time. First, we show how a dual exchange rate system can be interpreted as a tax (or subsidy) on international capital income. We make use of previous work by Huizinga (1996) . We will show that a dual exchange rate system gives a theoretical reason for a deviation from uncovered interest rate parity.
Second, we will discuss South Africa from 1973:01 until 1995:02. That is, we will give a detailed assessment of the historic development of South Africa's dual exchange rate system. For this we make use of previous work by Schaling (2005) . 7 Interestingly, we show that exactly, and only, during that particular period in the 1970s (highlighted in …gure 2), the South African government was able to in ‡uence the implicit subsidy.
Finally, we bring the issues to the data and do some empirical estimations for South Africa. By making use of a few straightforward estimating equations calculated: [(e 1 =e 2 ) (1 + i)] (1 + i ). That is, for a non-resident (US) investor the deviation from UIP is equal to the return he would obtain in South Africa minus the return he would obtain on comparable, domestic (US) assets. Following UIP this return di¤erential should be equal to zero. See the main text for a more elaborate discussion and, in particular, subsection 4.1 for a more elaborate discussion of the variables and its sources. 7 Schaling (2005), on his turn, built further on Farrell and Todani (2004) and Gidlow (1979) .
we …nd that the consequences of the implicit taxation and subsidy in a dual exchange rate are sizable and signi…cant, and indeed only in that (highlighted) period. In addition, we calculate the …scal implications of a dual exchange rate system for South Africa.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. The equivalence between …nancial taxation by way of taxes on cross-border capital ‡ows and a dual exchange rate system is shown in section 2. Section 3, analyses each of the …ve (dual) exchange rate regimes in place in South Africa for the period 1973-1995 in more detail. Section 4 and 5 discuss the data and the econometric approach, respectively. In section 6 our empirical results are given, and we conclude in section 7.
The model
By making use of some straightforward arbitrage relationships, this section will discuss the characteristics of a standard dual exchange rate system. This section builds on the model and intuition in Huizinga (1996).
Arbitrage relationships
For comparison, let us …rst assume that the home country (South Africa) has a single uni…ed exchange rate. Consider a two-period model, where in the …rst period one unit of currency is invested from the home country into the foreign country (the US). In the second period, both the interest and the principal are repatriated. More speci…cally, let i and i * be the domestic and foreign interest rate in perunages. Let e j be the exchange rate in period j, where subscript j = 1, 2. The exchange rate is fully convertible and de…ned as unit of domestic currency per unit of foreign currency (rand per dollar). A resident (SA) investor is indi¤erent between owning domestic (SA) and foreign (US) assets when the following arbitrage relationship holds
In period 1, the resident (SA) investor can convert one unit of his domestic currency into 1/e 1 units of foreign currency. In period 2, the interest and principal are repatriated at e 2 . Analogously, a non-resident (US) investor is indi¤erent between owning domestic (US) and foreign (SA) assets when the following arbitrage relationship holds
In period 1, the non-resident (US) investor can convert one unit of foreign currency into e 1 units of domestic currency. In period 2, the interest and principal are repatriated at 1/e 2 . Note that equation (1) and (2) are the same 8 and use the well-known concept of uncovered interest parity (UIP); a classical topic in international …nance and a building block of most of its theoretical models. 9 Now let us discuss the more interesting case of a standard dual exchange rate system (hereafter DRS as opposed to a uni…ed exchange rate system or URS). That is, we assume that there are separate exchange rates for current and capital account transactions in place (as we de…ned earlier). Consider again a two-period model, where in the …rst period one unit of currency is invested from the home country into the foreign country. In the second period, both the interest and the principal are repatriated. Let i and i * , again, be the domestic and foreign interest rate. In addition, let e j and f j be respectively the commercial (o¢ cial) and …nancial exchange rate in period j, j = 1, 2. As discussed above, e j is then related to current and f j to capital account transactions. The exchange rates are fully convertible. A resident (SA) investor is indi¤erent between owning domestic and foreign assets when the following arbitrage relationship holds
In period 1, the resident (SA) investor can convert one unit of his domestic currency into 1/f 1 units of foreign currency. In period 2, the principal and the interest are repatriated at the …nancial and commercial exchange rates, f 2 and e 2 , respectively. 10 Analogously, a non-resident (US) investor is indi¤erent between owning domestic and foreign assets when the following arbitrage relationship holds
In period 1, the non-resident (US) investor can convert one unit of foreign currency into f 1 units of domestic currency. In period 2, the principal and interest are again repatriated at the …nancial and commercial exchange rates, 1/f 2 and 1/e 2 , respectively. Contrary to equations (1) and (2), equations (3) and (4) are not the same and do not equal UIP. 11 This is of utmost importance to this paper and its consequences will be discussed in more detail in the following two subsections. 8 That is, equation (2) follows from rewriting equation (1) from the perspective of a nonresident (foreign) investor. In natural logs, for example, both equations can be written as follows{
where{ 0 = ln (1 + it),{ 0 = ln (1 + i t ) andê j = ln(e j ). 9 As in the literature, also this paper assumes rational expectations. That is, we will assume that e t+1 = Et [e t+1 ] + " t+1 , where Et [" t+1 ] = 0.
1 0 Interest, as other income from foreign investments, is documented in the current account. Conversely, the principal is documented in the capital account. 1 1 In natural logs equation (4) becomeŝ
, where s 1 and f 2 =e 2 .
The need for capital controls
Generally, equations (1) and (2) are consistent. That is, under a "normal", single exchange rate system (URS) there is no need for capital controls. To check this one could substitute either one of the two formulas into the other. The result will be an expression stating that the returns abroad equal the returns at home, or vice versa. The di¤erence between the two returns is zero. The arbitrage equations for a resident (SA) and a non-resident (US) investor are therefore consistent and will hold simultaneously. Consequently, it is not possible for an investor to reap excess returns 12 and there will be no need for capital controls. 13 On the other hand, equation (3) and (4) are generally not consistent. In other words, when a standard dual exchange rate system is in place there is a need for capital controls. To check this, let us assume that equation (4) in fact holds so that non-resident investors are indi¤erent between holding domestic and foreign assets (as we will see below this was the case for South Africa). Contrary to the result we obtained under a "normal" exchange rate system, when we now substitute any of the two equations into the other we obtain an expression that states that the di¤erence between the return at home and abroad could be di¤erent from zero
where v is the di¤erence between the return at home and abroad. So, theoretically under a DRS there could be a deviation from UIP. As Huizinga (1996) points out, when equation (4) holds a non-resident (US) investor, for example, can achieve a higher return on foreign assets, i.e. 1+i < (f 2 =f 1 )+(e 2 =f 1 )i * , if equation (5) is positive. This holds if the …nancial exchange rate (f j ) depreciates, i.e., 1/f 1 > 1/f 2 , and the commercial exchange rate (e j ) commands a premium over the …nancial exchange rate (f j ), i.e. f 2 > e 2 , or if both conditions are reversed. Any inconsistency of the arbitrage relationships (3) and (4) is a re‡ection of the fact that each of the two a¤ects a resident (SA) or a non-resident (US) investor disparately. With (3) and (4) not holding simultaneously, capital controls need to be introduced to prevent some investors from reaping in…nite gains.
Interestingly, equation (5) 
where{ 0 = ln (1 + i) and{ 00 ln (1 + i i ), where 1= and f 2 =e 2 . Take note that indeed, in contrast to 1' = 2', equation (3') 6 = (4'). We will discuss this in more detail below. 1 2 Which here -in the absence of capital controls -would allow investors to reap in…nite gains. This is shown below. 1 3 It should be noted that this is an obvious result because we already concluded in the previous subsection that equation (1) and (2) are the same.
as …gure 3 below shows, 14 the …nancial exchange rate depreciated and the commercial exchange rate commanded a premium over the …nancial exchange rate. As we discussed, in this case capital controls will have to be introduced on resident (SA) investors. Consequently, arbitrage relationship (3) becomes irrelevant. This indeed happened in South Africa. As a result, the authorities are then free to choose an exchange rate policy consistent with the desired domestic interest rate, i, according to arbitrage relationship (4). As Schaling (2005) notes, the South African capital controls enabled the South African Reserve Bank to target domestic interest rates (and/ or the commercial exchange rate) via interventions in the (commercial) foreign exchange market. This result is of high importance. 
The exchange rate as taxation
Finally, this subsection will consider the tax treatment of interest (or other income from foreign investment) implicit in a standard dual exchange rate system. Before we continue, it is important to note that South Africa had …ve di¤erent (dual) exchange rate regimes over the 1960s-1995 period. Only two of them equaled the standard dual exchange rate system as de…ned above. 15 First, let us obtain the subsidy and taxation implicit in a standard dual exchange rate system intuitively. Under such a system, a non-resident (say, US) investor holding domestic (SA) assets will receive 1/e 2 rather than 1/f 2 units of foreign currency for each unit of interest repatriated abroad. This implies that non-resident investors receive an additive subsidy s for each unit of interest equal to 1, where = f 2 /e 2 is the gross …nancial rate premium over the commercial rate. We have that
or, for completeness, s = =(1 ), 16 where is the tax rate on repatriated interest earned by (SA) residents abroad. 17 In addition, we can obtain the subsidy and taxation implicit in a standard dual exchange rate system in a more formal way. For this, let us rewrite equation (4), the arbitrage relationship under a standard dual exchange rate system for a non-resident (US) investor, to obtain 18
where s is given by equation (6) . The left-hand side, together with the …rst term on the right-hand side and the …rst two terms in the brackets on the right-hand side constitute the uncovered interest-rate parity condition (where we have substituted f for e) as obtained in subsection 2.1 (equation (4)). This is of importance and to see this we have to link the URS and DRS.
Let us make a general formula by rewriting equation (4) one more time to obtain
where we have decomposed the second term on the right-hand side of equation (4) as the product of the (future or 'expected') …nancial rand discount f 2 /e 2 and the 'expected' rate of nominal …nancial rand appreciation f 1 /f 2 . Under a standard URS, f j = e j and consequently equation (8) equals the standard URS for a non-resident (US) investor (equation (2)). We then have that UIP holds. However, things are di¤erent under a DRS. If we assume (as was the case for South Africa) that the …nancial rand trades at a discount vis-à-vis the commercial rand exchange rate, or f 2 /e 2 > 1, then equation (8) does no longer equal equation (2) . That is, under a DRS, the relevant arbitrage equation for a non-resident (US) investor does not equal UIP. 1 6 We know from equation (7), which is given below, that
. This can be rewritten as follows:
Knowing that 1 is equal to s we obtain that s = =(1 ). 1 7 The argument from the perspective of a resident investor is as follows. Under a standard DRS, resident (SA) investors holding foreign assets receive e 2 rather than f 2 units of domestic currency for each unit of repatriated interest. This implies that repatriated interest is taxed at the following rate = (f 2 e 2 ) =f 2 (7) or, for completeness, = ( 1)= , where = f 2 /e 2 is again the gross …nancial rate premium over the commercial rate. Since, SA residents were e¤ectively prohibited from investing o¤shore we will focus on equation (6) and not on equation (7). 1 8 See appendix (8.1) for the full derivation. Now let us go back to equation (4"). We now know that the left-hand side together with the …rst term and the …rst two terms in the brackets on the right-hand side (where we have substituted f j for e j ) constitute the uncovered interest-rate parity condition. However, contrary to a URS, under a DRS there is an additional term added to UIP. The third term in the brackets on the righthand side of equation (4") is the subsidy for a non-resident investor that is implicit in the standard dual exchange rate system times the domestic interest rate (si), where s is given by (6) . As expected the subsidy implicit in a standard dual exchange rate system has, for a non-resident (US) investor, a positive sign in equation (4"). As a result, we can conclude that for a non-resident (US) investor a dual exchange rate system gives a reason for a theoretical deviation from UIP. Secondly, we can conclude that, knowing that non-residents holding SA assets receive 1/e 2 rather than 1/f 2 units of foreign currency for each unit of interest repatriated abroad, a standard dual exchange rate system subsidizes capital in ‡ows, i.e. it subsidized international lending to SA. 19 
South Africa
From June 1961 until March 1995, South Africa experienced a variety of di¤erent (dual) exchange rate systems. Below we will discuss each of them in more detail, where we take South Africa to be the home country. 20 
The blocked rand system (1961-1976)
As pointed out by Gidlow (1976) , the blocked rand system was largely based on the measures taken after the Sharpeville massacre in March 1961 and the subsequent capital out ‡ow and decline in the gold and foreign exchange reserves. 1 9 Analogously, equation (3), the arbitrage relationship under a standard dual exchange rate system for a resident investor, can be rewritten (following similar steps as in appendix 8.1 but then using ( 1) = instead of s 1) to obtain
where is given by equation (7). The left-hand side together with the …rst term and the …rst two terms in the brackets on the right-hand side constitute the uncovered interest-rate parity condition for a resident investor as we discussed in subsection 2.1 (where we have substituted f j for e j ). Again, contrary to the uncovered interest parity condition, there is an additional term. The third term in the brackets on the right-hand side is the taxation for a resident investor that is implicit in the dual exchange rate system times the foreign interest rate ( i ).
As a result, we again obtain the result that a dual exchange rate system gives a reason for a theoretical deviation from UIP. As expected the taxation implicit in a standard dual exchange rate system has, for a resident investor, a negative sign in equation (3"). Since SA residents were e¤ectively prohibited from investing o¤shore, in the main text we will focus on equation (4" Stricter controls on capital out ‡ows from South Africa were introduced in order to prevent the depletion of foreign reserves.
The most important measure taken at that time was the introduction of restrictions on the repatriation of funds earlier invested in South Africa by nonresidents. Residents were already prohibited to transfer funds abroad. Farrell and Todani (2004) point out that, although non-residents could still sell domestic securities on the Johannesburg Stock Exchange (JSE) and interest and dividends could still be freely transferred to the country of origin of the investor, the proceeds of sales of South African assets were blocked within South Africa. These 'blocked rands' were deposited in blocked rand accounts in the name of the non-resident at a commercial bank. 21 Schaling (2005), in turn, points out that as a consequence the notional demand for foreign currency (supply of rand) did not materialize on the commercial market for rands. More speci…cally, only that demand induced by imminent liquidation of South African assets by non-residents materialized on the commercial rand market. As Schaling (2005) explains, the commercial exchange rate was therefore insulated from the selling pressures of South African securities by non-residents. As a result, the commercial exchange rate was likely to be substantially overvalued with respect to the hypothetical level of the exchange rate in the absence of the aforementioned controls.
The blocked rand balances could only be repatriated under certain conditions. Farrell and Todani (2004) summarize as follows: 22 (i) Non-residents could use blocked rands to purchase shares quoted on the JSE. These shares could be endorsed, exported and sold outside South Africa, for example in London. If the new non-resident owner of the shares sold them in South Africa, blocked rands were again created;
(ii) The non-resident could use blocked rands to purchase government, municipal and public utility stocks with a maturity of …ve years or more. Once these had been held for at least …ve years, they could be repatriated at the commercial exchange rate;
(iii) The non-resident could use the blocked rands to take up special nonresident bonds with …ve year maturities issued by the government. These could again be repatriated at the commercial exchange rate on maturity.
As pointed out by Schaling (2005) , and in line with (i), there was no restriction on a non-resident investor using his blocked rands to purchase local securities, then selling those securities to another non-resident for foreign currency and, subsequently, the sale of these local securities by the new non-resident owner in South Africa for blocked rands. As Schaling (2005) discusses, while individual non-residents could therefore disinvest from South Africa (if they found another non-resident willing to buy their South African …nancial assets), non-residents as a group could not.
As pointed out by Gidlow (1976) , the fact that non-residents could use their blocked rands to purchase shares quoted on the JSE, which then could be endorsed, exported and sold outside South Africa again, enabled London stock brokers to make a market for blocked rands. In this market the relevant monies were freely transferred between non-residents using a method known as 'gilt-wash'.
23
Via this 'gilt-wash' method, a de facto second currency emerged. Farrell and Todani (2004) point out that, although this parallel blocked rand market could be characterized as legal, it was not o¢ cially recognized. As Schaling (2005) notes, this was because South Africa operated under the aegis of Bretton Woods, i.e. under a system of …xed exchange rates. A ‡oating parallel exchange rate was an alien and probably unwelcome species at the time.
Under the blocked rand system a non-resident investor could invest in South African securities in two di¤erent ways, (a) He or she could use the direct channel via the o¢ cial foreign exchange market, that is to buy foreign currency on the o¢ cial (commercial) foreign exchange market and exchange the latter for South African securities. Note that this route of investment is di¤erent from the route under a standard dual exchange rate system; (b) Alternatively, he or she could use the indirect channel via the stock exchanges. That is, the non-resident could …rst buy South African securities listed in London with foreign currency, sell the securities in Johannesburg and get blocked rand in return in order to buy South African securities. Note that this route of investment is equal to the one under a standard dual exchange rate system.
It is important to note that the investor will end up with the same securities, i.e. South African securities. The only di¤erence is the way they are obtained (either via route (a) or via route (b)). Of course, the non-resident investor would have made use of the direct (indirect) channel when the commercial rand exchange rate traded at a discount (premium) vis-à-vis the blocked rand exchange rate.
Owing to the fact that the blocked rand exchange rate traded at a discount vis-à-vis the commercial rand exchange rate, it was cheaper for non-residents to invest in South Africa via the indirect channel. However, a non-resident investor could only invest into South Africa via the indirect channel (route b) if another non-resident, holding South African assets, was willing to disinvest from South Africa. Thus there could be no net investment into South Africa via the blocked rand market (the "closed pool" argument). As Schaling (2005) notes, this would be the case up to 1995 when the dual exchange rate system was abolished. Net investments, as a result, could only come into South Africa through the commercial market (route a). However that would only be attractive for non-resident investors in the counterfactual case of the blocked rate trading at a premium vis-à-vis the commercial rand exchange rate.
Let us combine the above information and summarize the blocked rand exchange rate system in a table. During the blocked rand exchange rate system, as during the other four exchange rate periods, resident investors were not allowed to invest abroad. Consequently, we left the case for a resident investor out of table 1 and all of the subsequent related tables (this is in line with the main text focusing on the arbitrage equations for non-residents only). Now, let us take e j and b j to be respectively the commercial and blocked rand exchange rate in period j, j = 1, 2. In addition, let (i), (ii), (iii) and (a) and (b) be the di¤erent routes of respectively repatriation and investment as discussed above. We obtain As pointed out by Farrell and Todani (2004) , although the possibility of abolishing the blocked rand exchange rate system was raised various times, changes were only announced in 1975. More speci…cally, changes in the exchange control regulations were made in order to boost non-resident investors'interest in South Africa. However, controls on capital out ‡ows by non-residents as a pool remained very much the same. But, some details of the mechanism were changed, resulting in the introduction of the securities rand exchange rate mechanism in February 1976.
From February 1976 onwards, the term 'securities rand'(instead of blocked rand) had to be used to denote the domestic sale and redemption of South African securities, and other investments in South Africa, owned by non-residents. All non-resident accounts falling under this category had to be designated securities rand accounts. 24 In addition, as Schaling (2005) notes, the blocked 2 4 Schaling (2005) accounts of immigrants to South Africa who had not completed three years of residence also had to be designated securities rand accounts. However, emigrant's funds that were blocked in South Africa, as other accounts of emigrants designated as blocked rand accounts, continued to be referred to as blocked rands. Consequently, from February 1976 onwards the term 'blocked rand'had a more restricted meaning.
As pointed out by Schaling (2005) , under the new regulations securities rand were bought and sold through brokers on the JSE. The idea was that by removing the necessity of dealing through the indirect (London) channel, blocked rands could be transferred more easily and more cheaply, and become more accessible to non-resident investors. In addition, under the new regulations, only those branches of authorized foreign exchange dealers who have been appointed as authorized banks may maintain securities rand balances. Consequently, the securities rand exchange rate system allowed for direct transfers between non-residents and for the trading of the securities rand through brokers on the JSE. Schaling (2005) explains that this was a major change with respect to the blocked rand exchange rate system. Allowing the latter would have granted o¢ cial recognition of the blocked rand exchange rate, an action that the authorities deemed undesirable on an era of …xed exchange rates. However, as Schaling (2005) points out, in 1976 the era of irrevocable …xed exchange rates was over. South Africa now had a variable rand-dollar peg (the commercial rand) combined with the securities rand, that is combined with an extensive menu of capital controls on residents and non-residents.
Another reason for changing to the securities rand system was that securities rand would be bought and sold through brokers on the JSE, thereby relocating trade from London to Johannesburg. 25 Farrell and Todani (2004), though, point out that this did not materialize, primarily because of the dominance of London as the …nancial centre. The familiarity of non-resident investors with London, the technical superiority of the market and the operations of London dealers as principals in the blocked (and now the securities) rand market were all contributory factors.
Finally, Gidlow (1976) points out that, by allowing non-resident balances to be transferred freely and to o¢ cially recognize the blocked (now the securities) rand discount, the South African Reserve Bank (SARB) had now the ability to enter the market for securities rand as well. Hence, the South African Reserve Bank could now intervene in the securities rand market. This paper will show that this move by the South African government was of utmost importance for the …nancial implications of the dual exchange rate system. We will get back to this in section 6.
Finally, let us again summarize the exchange rate system in a table. We take e j and s j to be respectively the commercial and securities rand exchange rate in period j, j = 1, 2. In addition, if we again take (a) to be the commercial rand market route and (b) to be the securities rand market route for investment into South Africa we obtain the following table 26 
The …nancial rand I (1979-1983)
Asked by the government to investigate exchange rate arrangements in South Africa, Gerhard de Kock, later to be governor of the South African Reserve Bank, published its relevant interim report in January 1979. 27 The report included both short-term and long-term recommendations. Farrell and Todani (2004) summarize it in the following way. In the longer-term, on the assumption that the pressures on the capital account of the balance of payments would ease over time, the report proposed a uni…ed rand exchange rate system subject to a managed- ‡oat, with limited exchange controls being applied only to residents. In the shorter-term, the commission considered a formal dual exchange rate system with a managed, market determined rate for an independent and ‡exible 'commercial rand'and a more freely ‡oating rate for a '…nancial rand'.
As pointed out by Farrell and Todani (2004) , the changes included extending the uses which non-residents could make of the currency, as well as allowing certain resident transactions to take place via the (securities rand) market. This widening of the market was in order to remove the imbalance between the supply and demand for securities rand, that is lowering the securities rand discount. Equity investment and disinvestment by non-residents, as well as transfers from deceased estates to non-residents and immigrant funds, became '…nancial rand' transactions. Residents'use of the …nancial market was to be expanded gradually and would require approval, although not necessarily on an individual basis for small applications.
As Schaling (2005) points out, the gradual expansion of residents'and nonresidents'use of securities rand was equivalent to an increase in the demand for securities rand. It is important to note that restricting the supply was not an option [Schaling (2005) ]. Restricting the supply of securities rand would have been possible only if controls on out ‡ows were relaxed. So, balance of payments items associated with capital in ‡ows that were previously channelled through the commercial market were now directed through the …nancial market. But, as pointed out by Farrell and Todani (2004) , the …nancial rand exchange rate system did not channel all current account transactions through the commercial rand and all capital account transaction through the …nancial market, as would be the case under a standard dual exchange rate system (as discussed in section 3). All loan funds were to be transferred via the commercial market, that is both the principal and the interest. Loan funds included: bank loans, syndicated loans, private and public bond issues, debenture issues, mortgages, parent company current accounts and shareholder loans.
As Farrell and Todani (2004) note, there were three important reasons for loan funds to be transferred through the commercial market. First, with the …nancial rand likely to be at a discount to the commercial rand, it was considered 'unfair' to expect resident (SA) borrowers to repay at the …nancial rate existing loans originally contracted at the o¢ cial rate. Second, it was di¢ cult to distinguish loans and trade credit. A …nal reason was that Gerhard de Kock argued that in a period of rapid economic growth the commercial exchange rate would need the support of the net in ‡ow of loan funds. As Schaling (2005) explains, growth in South Africa would suck in imports, especially of capital goods, which tend to increase the demand for foreign exchange and would place pressure on the commercial rand exchange rate. If loan funds increase at such times, diverting them through the commercial rand market would increase the supply of foreign exchange in this market, o¤setting the excess demand for foreign currency.
In addition to the widening of the market, Gerhard de Kock proposed that intervention by the Central Bank was allowed as part of a coordinated policy of intervention in the commercial and …nancial markets. 28 As Schaling (2005) points out, this measure was taken in order to smooth sharp movements in the exchange rate, although it was anticipated that intervention in the …nancial rand market would be infrequent and of limited magnitude.
Finally, let us summarize the …nancial rand system in a table. If we take e j and f j to be respectively the commercial and …nancial rand exchange rate in period j, j = 1, 2. If, in addition, we take (a) to denote the commercial rand market route and (b) the …nancial rand market route we obtain 
The uni…ed rand (1983-1985)
In February 1983 the …nancial rand regime was abolished and was succeeded by a single uni…ed exchange rate system (a 'URS'as opposed to a DRS). That is, it was replaced by a system equal to the one as discussed in subsection 2.1. The uni…ed rand was of short duration, though. Farrell and Todani (2004) point out that the timing of the uni…cation was a 'disaster', among others due to the relatively high discount of 17% of the …nancial rand vis-à-vis the commercial rand (or in logs, f t -e t ) at that time. Although controls on non-resident investors were e¤ectively removed at this time, those on capital transfers by resident investors remained largely in place. The apparatus for registering non-resident ownership of securities was also retained.
Let us again summarize the exchange rate system in a table. If we take e j to be the commercial rand exchange rate in period j, j = 1, 2, we obtain the following table 29 
The …nancial rand II (1985-1995)
As pointed out by Farrell and Todani (2004) , the …nancial rand exchange rate system was re-introduced on 2 September 1985, as part of the response of the South African Reserve Bank to South Africa's debt crisis. This crisis was largely triggered by political events. Notably, the Rubicon speech on 15 August 1985, by then State President P.W. Botha, triggered large scale capital ‡ights out of South Africa. Prior to the speech expectations arose that political reforms of the apartheid system would be made to appease foreign bankers. In his speech, given to the Natal Congress of the ruling National Party, P. W. Botha e¤ectively destroyed this expectation. As a response, the Government suspended trading on the JSE and the foreign exchanges through to 2 September.
Further events, prior to the Rubicon speech, that helped building the crisis were that the South African government declared the State of Emergency on 20 July 1985, the French government's announcement of restrictions on investment in South Africa and the circulating rumors that international banks would not renew loans to South Africa, which were falling due at the end of August.
30
More speci…c, as Farrell and Todani (2004) explain, the 1985 debt crisis was preceded by the refusal of US banks to roll over loans to South Africa. In August, Chase Manhattan Bank made the decision to call in all its outstanding loans to South Africa and other banks followed suit.
As a response, on 1 September 1985, an emergency package of measures was announced that included a moratium on debt re-payments (the so-called 'standstill arrangement') and the re-introduction of the …nancial rand exchange rate system. Both were put in practice the following day. It was not until 13 March 1995, that the latter was abolished. From this date onwards non-residents were able to invest and repatriate funds, and transfer capital and current gains, without restriction.
31 Farrell and Todani (2004) note that, following the abolition of the …nancial rand, the gradual liberalization of exchange control has proceeded smoothly until the present time. 32 Finally, if we again summarize the …nancial exchange rate system we obtain table 3.
Data and variables
All data series were collected (or computed) for the period 1973 until 1995. More speci…cally, we make use of data from 1973:01 until 1995:02. The observations have a monthly frequency and therefore total 266. In addition, the estimations, which are described in the next two sections, make use of the following time series: 33 The interest rate for South Africa (domestic) and for the United States (foreign) is taken to be the three-month treasury bill rate (as perunages). The source is Thomson Datastream, with data labels: SAGBILL3 and USGBILL3, respectively. We obtained daily observations, but we will make use only of the day that is closest to the end-of-the-month. These variables are denoted as: i t and i t , respectively.
The commercial and …nancial rand exchange rates (de…ned as unit of domestic currency per unit of foreign currency) have been obtained from the South African Reserve Bank. The observations were obtained as end-ofthe-month. Note that during one of the …ve periods a uni…ed exchange rate regime was in place. Consequently, we only have the …nancial rand exchange rate for four periods. 34 These variables are denoted as: e t and f t , respectively.
Then we computed the four variables that we will actually use in our estimation (for this see the next section). First, we computed the following variables: ln (i t ) and ln (i t ), which we denote respectively as:{ t and{ t .
We also computed the following variable:
f t+1 , which we computed as follows:f t+1 f t , wheref t+1 = ln (f t+1 ) andf t = ln (f t ) :
Finally, we computed the implicit subsidy: ln (s t ), which we will denote as:ŝ t . Again, s t is given by equation (6) or, more speci…cally, s = [(f t+1 e t+1 )=e t+1 ].
Econometric speci…cation
In this section we will discuss the equation to be estimated. The results will be discussed in the next section. As was noted in the previous section, we take the relevant investment to be a three-month government bond that will be held for the life of the bond. Before we start it is important to summarize the arbitrage relationships for a three-month government bond. We do this because of the unequal treatment of di¤erent assets in South Africa's (dual) exchange rate systems. 35 
Summary for the three-month bond
In section 3, we discussed the di¤erent (dual) exchange rate systems that were in place in South Africa from 1960 until 1995. Below we give a summary for a threemonth bond by making use of the elementary arbitrage relationships that were introduced in section 2. Again, we do not discuss the case for a resident investor. As resident investors were not allowed to invest in the foreign country their arbitrage relationships are irrelevant. 36 Moreover, as we extensively discussed in section 3, and as can be seen from …gure 3, the …nancial rand exchange rate traded at a discount vis-à-vis the commercial rand exchange rate. Consequently, we will only discuss the indirect channel for investment into South Africa.
For the blocked rand (1961 -1976 ) and the securities rand (1976-1979) periods we therefore obtain the following arbitrage relationship
where the non-resident investor invests and repatriates the principal at the …-nancial rand exchange rate (f 1 and f 2 , respectively), whereas he/she repatriates the interest at the (managed) commercial exchange rate (e 2 ). 37 Arbitrage relationship (9) should look familiar as it is equal to equation (4) . That is, it is equal to a standard dual exchange rate system as we discussed in section 2. As was extensively discussed in subsection 2.3, this arbitrage relationship contains an implicit subsidy. This result is of high importance.
The arbitrage relationships under each of the two …nancial rand regimes (1979-1983 and 1985-1995) are identical. We obtain the following arbitrage relationship
Under each of the two periods, the non-resident investor would have invested the principal at the …nancial exchange rate and would have repatriated both the principal and the interest at the …nancial exchange rate.
Finally, for the uni…ed rand period (1983) (1984) (1985) we obtain the following arbitrage relationship
Under this regime, the non-resident investor would have invested the principal at the commercial exchange rate and would have repatriated both the principal and the interest at the commercial exchange rate. Take note that equation (11) equals equation (2) . The latter, as we showed in section 2, is equal to the uncovered interest parity condition.
For completeness, we summarize the relevant arbitrage relationships for a non-resident investor, holding a three-month South African government bond under a DRS, in table 5 below. No, it equals a URS
Estimating the impact of the implicit subsidy
Now, we are ready to test whether the subsidy implicit in South Africa's dual exchange rate system was of signi…cance. For this we go back to the model and results we obtained earlier in this paper. That is, we will make use of equation (4") that we obtained in section 2. Let us rewrite equation (4") as an equation that can be directly estimated. In order to do this, we rewrite (4") in terms of the domestic (SA) interest rate and take natural logs, so that we obtain
where{ t = ln(i t );{ t = ln(i t ); f t+1 =f t+1 f t , wheref t+1 = ln(f t+1 ) and
The lefthand side is the domestic (South African) interest rate. The right hand side now includes the subsidy implicit in a dual exchange rate. It should be obvious now for the reader to see where we are going. The main aim of this paper was to see what in ‡uence the subsidy implicit in South Africa's dual exchange rate system had on the domestic (SA) interest rate. Our argument is that a dual exchange rate system contains an implicit subsidy and that this implicit subsidy would lead to a lower interest rate in South Africa. In equation (12), the parameter
The results
This section will report the results of the estimating equation we discussed in the previous section. That is, we have a look at the sign, the signi…cance and the magnitude of the subsidy implicit in a dual exchange rate system.
The implicit subsidy
We estimated equation (12) (12) by separating the periods where a standard dual exchange rate system was in place, or not. That is, we included a dummy for the blocked and the securities rand exchange rate periods (BR&SR) and for the …rst …nancial rand period (FR(I)). The results are given in table 6 in the column under regression 1. blocked-and securities rand combined, the blocked-, the securities-and the …rst …nancial rand exchange rate system, respectively.
All of the variables have the sign that we expected. The coe¢ cients of the variables{ t and f t+1 are positive as expected. In addition, the coe¢ cient of the implicit subsidy (ŝ t ) is negative during the period where a dual exchange rate system was in place and, strongly supporting the argument of this paper, this coe¢ cient is non-negative when no dual exchange system was in place. So, it seems as if an increase in the subsidy leads to a decrease in the domestic interest rate when a DRS is in place; indeed con…rming the argument of this paper. Moreover, as expected, we obtain a 2 (the coe¢ cient on the dummy variable BR&SR) that is between 0 and -1. However, although the signs of the variables and the magnitude of 2 are as expected none of the variables, with the exception of{ t , is signi…cant; a seemingly disappointing result.
We estimated equation (12) again. But now we also distinguished among the two periods where a standard dual exchange rate system was in place. We do this to see whether there was a di¤erent e¤ect of the implicit subsidy in these periods. Our results are surprising. As can be seen in the column under regression 2 in table 6, the variables have again the expected sign. Now, however, we obtain the result that the implicit subsidy is signi…cant during the securities rand period but not during the blocked rand period. How is this possible? First, note that the fact that the implicit subsidy was not signi…cant during the …rst …nancial rand period is to be expected, as no standard dual exchange rate system existed at the time and, consequently, no implicit subsidy existed. But why was the implicit subsidy not signi…cant during the blocked rand system? We showed above that in that period, just as during the securities rand period, a standard DRS was in place.
The answer is interesting and has strong implications. Let us fully write out, and for one more time rewrite, equation (4) to obtain
where the third term on the right hand side is again the implicit subsidy payment (si). Indeed, an increase in the subsidy leads to a decrease in the domestic (South African) interest rate. As we can see from …gure 3, which was given earlier, the commercial rand (e j ) was very stable during the blocked rand and the securities rand period. The reason is that until 1979 the exchange rate was essentially …xed, being pegged to various currencies. 40 Consequently, over these two periods the South African government was not able to in ‡uence e 2 . As a result, the implicit subsidy could only be increased -and therefore the domestic interest rate decreased -by engineering an increase in f 2 . Now, in section 3 we have argued extensively that although during the blocked rand period the parallel market could be characterized as legal, it was never o¢ cially recognized by the South African government. 41 However, as was also extensively discussed in section 3, in February 1976 the securities rand exchange rate mechanism was introduced. Under the new regulations securities rand were bought and sold through brokers on the JSE. 42 As Gidlow (1976) pointed out, by allowing non-resident balances to be transferred freely and to o¢ cially recognize the blocked (and now the securities) rand discount, the Central Bank had now the ability to enter the market for securities rand as well. Hence, the Central Bank could now intervene in the securities rand market. This result is of high importance. That is, it could in ‡uence f 2 in equation (13) . As a result, it was only during the securities rand that the South African government via its central bank (the SARB) could actually in ‡uence the implicit subsidy and thereby lower the domestic interest rate. This was therefore the reason that the implicit subsidy was only of economic and statistical signi…cance during the securities rand in our estimation. In addition, this now also provides the reason why Figure 2 indicates that only the securities rand regime implied a structural deviation from uncovered interest rate parity (remember: the highlighted part in …gure 2).
As noted above, and as can be seen in the column under regression 2 in table 6, the variables again have the expected sign. An increase in the interest rate in the United States and an expected depreciation of the …nancial rand each have a positive e¤ect on the domestic (SA) interest rate. In contrast to our previous regression, now both variables are signi…cant. Finally, note that the magnitude of 2 (the coe¢ cient on the dummy variable SR) is again, as expected, between 0 and -1. In other words, during the securities rand period the market took into account the probability that the DRS could be abolished. That this sentiment was present in the market is illustrated in Figure 2 , where the return for a non-resident (US) holder of South African debt in excess of the return on comparable assets in the United States (the investment subsidy, which in turn came about as a by-product of South Africa's dual exchange rate system) decreased markedly before 1979:02; that is, before the securities rand was actually abolished in 1979:02.
The question that then remains is, to what extent could the South African government actually decrease the domestic interest rate? According to equation (13) this in ‡uence was likely too be quite limited. If the South African authorities would increase the implicit subsidy by raising f 2 they then also increased the second term in equation (13) ; namely the implied depreciation of the rand exchange rate. As a result, we have that the South African government had a lower domestic interest rate during the securities rand only thanks to the level e¤ect of the premium that the commercial rand commanded over the …nancial rand (indeed, see the jump in the premium by inspecting …gure 3). From month to month, however, the South African government had little power to decrease their domestic interest rate by means of increasing the implicit subsidy as it would have led to a depreciation of the rand exchange rate.
Bene…ts to the South African government
South Africa's capital in ‡ow subsidy has lowered the domestic cost of borrowing to the advantage of domestic borrowers, including the South African govern-ment. The budgetary e¤ect of a lower domestic interest rate can be calculated at follows. First, let us assume that the non-resident investors are the marginal investors. We then calculate how much higher the (long-term) government debt yield would have to be if the implicit interest subsidy to non-residents were taken away, on the assumption that the rates of depreciation of the dual exchange rates remain unchanged. 43 This simply equals the implicit subsidy payment as calculated by equation (6) times i t . The calculated government debt yield di¤erential multiplied by the stock of domestic government debt (net of any government debt held by monetary authorities) yields an estimate of the debt-service savings on account of the dual exchange rate system. Take note that this is the theoretical maximum of debt-service savings; i.e. it would be true only when 2 = 1. From the previous subsection, however, we know that 2 = 0:0479. Then, by multiplying the theoretical maximum debt-service savings by this amount (0.0479) we obtain the debt-service savings for South Africa on account of the dual exchange rate system. These debt-service savings are illustrated, as a percentage of GDP, in …gure 3 below. The …gure indicates that the …nancial implications of a dual exchange rate system can be substantial. More speci…cally, the computed debt-service savings due to a dual exchange rate system reached a high of 0.1 percent of South Africa's GDP in September 1978 as then the actual government yield and the …nancial rate premium were both relatively high. Theoretically, it could have been as a high as 2.15 percent of GDP. On average, over the securities rand period, the debt-service savings amounted to 0.07 percent of GDP (theoretical maximum: 1.46). Whereas, over the blocked rand period the debt-service savings amounted to 0.02 percent of GDP (theoretical maximum: 0.41). Take note that indeed the implicit revenue is substantially higher during the securities rand than during the blocked rand exchange rate period.
Conclusion
A dual exchange rate system with separate commercial and …nancial exchange rates drives a wedge between the domestic and foreign returns on comparable assets. This paper showed, by building further on Huizinga (1996) , that the arbitrage relationships linking the returns on domestic and foreign assets for resident and non-resident investors are therefore generally inconsistent. This implies that capital controls have to be an integral part of a dual exchange rate system. Furthermore, it was shown how a dual exchange rate system can be interpreted as a border tax or subsidy on international capital income ‡ows. We did this by rewriting the above mentioned arbitrage relationships and singling out the implicit tax or subsidy. This paper then presented empirical evidence on the aforementioned implicit tax or subsidy. First, it is shown that a subsidy implicit in a dual exchange rate system is a signi…cant determinant for the deviation from uncovered interest parity. That is, it is shown that a dual exchange rate system makes it possible for a government to (substantially) decrease its domestic interest rate. In addition, we calculated that the overall debt-service savings from this lower domestic rate can be substantial, thereby providing a rational for having a dual exchange rate with capital controls as part of a country's optimal tax policy. This paper, though, also discussed in detail the historic development of South Africa's (dual) exchange rate systems. We showed, by building further on previous work by Schaling (2005) , that South Africa's dual exchange rate system was the unintended consequence of the imposition of controls on capital out ‡ows in 1960 after the Sharpeville massacre and the subsequent capital out ‡ow. Furthermore, again by building further on Schaling (2005), we point out that the dual exchange rate system led to many perverse unanticipated e¤ects. Severely limiting capital in ‡ows was one of them.
As a result, the apparent bene…ts of using capital controls and/ or a dual exchange rate system as part of a governments tax policy may be limited. The theoretical need to combine dual exchange rate systems with capital controls and their potential perverse unanticipated e¤ects, prima facie render dual exchange rate systems unattractive. Furthermore, and not yet discussed, dual exchange rate systems are relatively nontransparent, as the implicit tax rates have to be calculated from exchange rate data. In addition, taxing capital income through the exchange rate system further introduces undesirable uncer-tainty to the extent that the exchange rates are variable. 45 Finally, the link between administrative exchange rates and capital controls and taxation also may give rise to opportunities for favoritism and abuse. These arguments imply that a dual exchange rate system may be a rather inept way to impose a tax or subsidy on cross-border capital income ‡ows. Thereby providing a rationale for the recent trend in exchange rate liberalization and uni…cation.
From equation (4) to (13)
Rewriting
gives
where the second term on the right-hand side is negligible (small times small is very small). Rewriting gives
where now the third term on the right-hand side is negligible (small times small is very small). Then, after rewriting equation (18), we obtain
The left-hand side together with the …rst two terms on the right-hand side (where we have substituted f j for e j ) equal UIP. Note that this is a di¤erent way of writing down UIP than equation (2); especially many elementary textbooks on international economics write it like (13) because of the ease to understand this particular formulation. As we see from (13) , when a dual exchange rate system is in place (so f j 6 = e j ), UIP does not hold and we have a deviation from UIP equal to the implicit subsidy (taxation) times the South African interest rate (si for nonresident investors and i for resident investors).
